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We propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover, and examine its implications for the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on optimal decisions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Theory suggests that such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms; we document that this induces them to sometimes replace CEOs who investors disagree with, controlling for firm performance. A lower level of CEO-investor disagreement serves to partially “protect” CEOs from being fired, thus reducing turnover-performance sensitivity, which we also document. We also show that firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Using various empirical strategies, we rule out other confounding interpretations of our findings. We conclude that disagreement, independently of firm performance, affects forced CEO turnover.

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CEO turnover ;  Corporate governance ;  Heterogeneous beliefs ;  Investor-management disagreement

Abstract

特邀编委 李铭俊 丁远 执行编委 陈杰平 编委会成员 许斌 芮萌 陈世敏 白诗莉 陈少晦　

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Corporate Social Responsibility ;  CSR ;  企业社会责任

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We study the long-run effects of conflict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on self-reported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting survey-based results from this literature as causal.

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Conflict ;  social attitudes ;  World War II

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We introduce a novel concept of network interactions in which board connections provide access to external spheres of political influence, state ownership, and family control. We posit this form of indirect access via board association enables connected firms to benefit from information privy to external networks while avoiding their resource-based costs of membership. Board network data are assembled for 1290 East Asian firms and linked to hand-collected data on political connections and corporate ownership around the 2008–09 crisis. Companies with board connections to state-owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance and stock returns. In countries with weak institutional development, board connections to politically connected firms were also beneficial.

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Board networks ;  Corporate ownership ;  Firm performance ;  Political connections

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作者系中欧国际工商学院金融学副教授，中欧国际工商学院边晓璇对此文也有贡献

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This paper finds that stricter laws regulating third-party debt collection reduce the number of third-party debt collectors, lower the recovery rates on delinquent credit card loans, and lead to a modest decrease in the openings of new revolving lines of credit. Further, stricter third-party debt collection laws are associated with fewer consumer lawsuits against third-party debt collectors but not with a reduction in the overall number of consumer complaints. Overall, stricter third-party debt collection laws appear to restrict access to new revolving credit but have an ambiguous effect on the nonpecuniary costs that the debt collection process imposes on borrowers.

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Consumer credit ;  Contract enforcement ;  Creditor rights ;  Debt collection ;  Household finance ;  Law and finance