CEIBS Research Team with three professors and two research assistants conducted an online survey from April 2nd to April 9th 2020, receiving 1,182 responses in total. 892 (75.5%) survey participants work for Chinese-owned firms or firms with 50% or more Chinese ownership, and 290 (24.5%) work for foreign-owned firms in China or firms with more than 50% foreign ownership.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
This paper investigates whether and how emerging markets reward firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We focus on the socially responsible investment (SRI) index, which lists the top CSR performers and serves as a tool to help investors make investment decisions based on financial and social criteria. We empirically test the financial market responses to the announcements of pioneering SRI indices recently launched in Brazil, China, and South Africa. We find that inclusion on an SRI index in these markets is associated with positive abnormal returns. However, inclusion on an SRI index does not benefit all firms equally: the positive financial response is strengthened by R&D expenditures but weakened by advertising expenditures; it is stronger for firms that have expanded globally to developing countries than those to developed countries.
Rajendra Srivastava and V. Kumar served as Special Issue Guest Editors for this article.
Corporate social responsibility
Socially responsible investment index
Production and Operations Management
This study investigates a novel mechanism—multiple‐winner award rules—that are widely used in e‐procurement auctions and crowdsourcing sites. In many e‐procurement auctions, the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) specifies three rules before the auction starts: (i) the size of the finalist set (from which the winner[s] will be chosen); (ii) the number of winners; and (iii) the allocation of the contract among the winners. We examine how these three rules affect auction performance using a dataset of online procurement auctions across a variety of product categories. We find that the multiple‐winner award rules significantly impact the suppliers’ participation decisions, which is an important factor in determining the economic performance of the auction (i.e., buyer's savings). Most interestingly, these three rules systematically induce opposite effects on auction participation for two types of suppliers: experienced and inexperienced bidders. For example, increasing the number of winners encourages experienced suppliers, but discourages inexperienced suppliers from participating in the auction. On the other hand, raising the disparity in the contract allocation among winning bidders (e.g., from 50/50 to 90/10 split) deters experienced suppliers, but motivates inexperienced suppliers to participate. These findings provide guidelines for industrial buyers and crowdsourcing hosts on how to effectively make use of multiple‐winner design levers to promote suppliers’ participation when designing procurement auctions and crowdsourcing contests.
Determining the optimal market entry timing for successive product generations is a critical decision for firms. Pioneering studies on market entry timing have focused on purchase-to-own (PTO) products (e.g., computers) and assumed that an old product generation can continue to be sold after the release of a new generation. In this study, both PTO products and subscribe-to-use (STU) products (e.g., Office 365) are considered, and an old generation can either coexist with or be completely replaced by the new generation. We develop a multi-generation diffusion modeling framework to help determine the optimal market entry timing for a new product generation under such diverse business scenarios. Unlike prior literature, we find that for PTO products, the optimal entry timing for a new generation can be any time during a finite planning horizon; not introducing a new generation may be optimal only if the old generation will be completely replaced upon the introduction of the new generation. Under an infinite planning horizon, the second PTO product generation should not be released until the first generation has reached full market penetration. Of greater interest, for STU products, a new generation should either be released now or never be released, regardless of the length of the planning horizon and whether the old and new generations can coexist in the market or not.