It has been recognized that previous experiences can provide different types of feedback. However, it has not been systematically explored why firms are more likely to learn effectively from certain types of experience than others. From a feedback-based learning perspective, we argue that it is useful not only to focus on feedback valence (success or failure experiences) but also to examine feedback saliency (the magnitude of the experience’s influence). Based on a sample of acquisitions by U.S. firms, our results indicate that a firm’s success experience drives up the premium that it pays for a subsequent acquisition, whereas a failure experience reduces this subsequent premium. Moreover, we find that the magnitude of the effects of the four types of experiences—small failure, big failure, small success, and big success—does not follow a symmetrical pattern of inverse effects.
Asian Academy of Management Journal
Newcomers contribute to organizational innovation by bringing in new knowledge and ideas, on the one hand, and by collaborating and exchanging with incumbents, on the other. We propose that an organization's ability to use these contributions is influenced by hiring rate, hiring rate change, and hiring rate dispersion, which affect both the flow of new ideas into the organization and the level of collaboration between newcomers and incumbents. Using four years of data from a large, multi-industry sample, we find that hiring rate and hiring rate dispersion increase organizational innovation. We also find that increases in hiring rates from year to year are positively related to innovation for organizations with more collaborative work practices, while the relationship between hiring rate dispersion and innovation is less positive when organizations have more collaborative work practices. This study highlights how temporal patterns of hiring influence human capital acquisition and development.
Since 1945, the liberal-democratic model of capitalism spread across the globe, ultimately prevailing over communism. Over the past two decades, a new statist-authoritarian model has begun diffusing across East Asia. Rather than rejecting capitalism, authoritarian leaders harness it to uphold their rule. Based on extensive research of East Asia's largest corporations and sovereign wealth funds, this book argues that the most aggressive version of this model does not belong to China. Rather, it can be found in Malaysia and Singapore. Although these countries are small, the implications are profound because one-third of all countries in the world possess the same type of regime. With an increasing number of these authoritarian regimes establishing sovereign wealth funds, their ability to intervene in the corporate sectors of other countries is rapidly expanding.
This case deals with a Chinese startup, Testin, forging partnerships with multiple large multinational corporations (“MNCs” in short, e.g., Microsoft, IBM, ARM, Intel). In order to help developers economize the time spent on quality assurance (QA), Testin was founded by Jun Wang with six of his former colleagues working at Pica Corporation in June 2011. In the past years, Testin had served over 800,000 app developers by conducting more than 150 million quality and security tests on over 2.5 million mobile apps through its automated Cloud Testin (云测) service supported by its testing labs and its Crowd Testin service for solving further problems by part-time qualified testers. It had received several rounds of financing totaling over USD 80 million. Many Chinese Internet companies tried to acquire Testin, and a well-known multinational company asked Testin to sign an exclusive service contract. Wang and his partners resisted such offers and were determined that Testin should maintain neutrality. Thinking about the five-year old enterprise, Wang wondered how to ensure Testin could “stay hungry and stay foolish”.
A striking feature of these relationships discussed in this case is that the venture is based in an emerging market context (China) whereas several of the key large corporate partners are headquartered in advanced markets. Thus the partnerships being forged are arguably between non-traditional allies.
multinational corporations (MNCs)
This case describes the development and struggles of Opple Lighting (Opple), a leading Chinese company in the lighting industry. Opple explored and developed an e-commerce business in response to the threat of emerging e-commerce retail channels in the online lighting market. There were significant differences involved in running an e-commerce business versus a traditional (offline) sales business in this industry, and most of Opple's management team disapproved of the development of the e-commerce business division; they believed that e-commerce operations would inevitably cannibalize the existing offline business. How would the e-commerce business division gain the needed approval and support from the other business divisions? There were "hidden rules" behind the murky pricing practices in the traditional lighting industry, whereas e-commerce stressed price transparency. How could the e-commerce business be operated to avoid direct conflict with the offline sales channels? Traditional lighting products were characterized by a long product development cycle with a large-scale supply-chain distribution channel, whereas e-commerce lighting products emphasized small batches with rapid development and updates. How could the e-business departments resolve the challenges and conflicts in production, logistics, new product development, and distribution between traditional and e-commerce sales?
This case details how Opple grew its e-commerce business from zero to RMB 1.5 billion in five years and optimized its e-commerce supply chain by reorganizing its product development process, manufacturing, logistics, warehousing, marketing, and after-sales service. It also looks at how Opple adjusted organizational structure changes, encouraged innovation, overhauled talent management, and improved its performance management systems to eventually achieve rapid growth in sales performance. In 2017, sales revenues for three-commerce division were nearly 2.1 billion yuan, representing 25% of Opple's total revenue and making the e-commerce business a new growth engine for the company. That division also encouraged changes to Opple's culture, organization redesign, and incentive scheme, helping to drive rapid growth in the company's other businesses and – more importantly – providing the necessary incubation period for several other Opple businesses.
organizational structure adjustment
traditional enterprise transformation
The primary purpose of this case is to teach and/or integrate key strategic planning frameworks used during the strategic management process, including those used in external analysis (i.e., industry, suppliers, customers, and competitors) and internal analysis (i.e., resources, capabilities, and firm value chain). It also introduces a framework for strategy formulation at the business-level (i.e., cost-leadership, differentiation, and focused strategies). This case is applied for teaching strategic planning and business-level strategy formulation. It is particularly useful to illustrate strategic planning in the Chinese context.
The case introduces the formation of Branded Lifestyle Holdings Ltd. (Braded Lifestyle), an Asian apparel retail company that emerged from Fung Retailing Limited’s acquisition of Hong Kong–listed Hang Ten Group. With five apparel brands (i.e., Hang Ten, H:Connect, Arnold Palmer, LEO, and Roots), Branded Lifestyle had been profitable in most of its markets in Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore). However, it had struggled in China, reporting annual loses until its acquisition in 2011. Ramanathan Dilip Shivkumar (Dilip) was appointed as the new Managing Director of Global Brands of Branded Lifestyle in 2014. Looking at the evolving apparel industry in China and reviewing the company’s weak performance over the past years, Dilip needed to develop a strategic plan to turnaround the company’s operations and build a strong and sustainable business in the Chinese market.
This case describes the process of entering the Chinese market undertaken by Zotter Chocolate, an Austrian chocolate producer. There are several things that make this company stand out: it is a small, family-run entrepreneurial firm from Austria which makes a wide range of unconventional flavours of chocolate. It prides itself on being organic and fair trade, and has attracted a number of loyal customers and visitors to its “chocolate factory” in its headquarters located in Bergl, Austria. After successfully entering the German market, an “obvious” target for a firm from Austria, the founder, Josef Zotter, and his family considered where to go next in 2010. After comparing the US and Chinese chocolate markets, Zotter Chocolate selected China as its first major non-European market. The case introduces how Zotter sought out a local partner in Shanghai, and decided to enter the market with an “experience” offering in its first chocolate factory outside its home market, overseen by the founder's daughter Julia. Their innovations and learning process are also presented in this case. The case ends with Julia's key concerns about Zotter China's next step when she had to leave China for the headquarters of Zotter Chocolate in Austria in August 2017.