From the author of Doing Business in Europe (SAGE, 2018), Gabriele Suder has teamed up with Sumati Varma based in India, and Terence Tsai from China to bring this comprehensive solution for Asian business teaching and learning. The book offers a highly productive mix of international business and marketing theory, and is packed with pedagogical tools to engage and develop understanding, including two full-length corporate case studies per chapter.
This is a unique volume covering the most relevant topics of Asia-focused business and management practice spanning from cross-cultural management to supply chain resilience to market entry and expansion strategy, and much more.
Specifically designed to meet the needs of Postgraduate, MBA and those taking part in Executive Education programmes, this exciting learning experience will prepare Asia's leaders of the future.
Most extant literature implicitly equates obtaining information through board interlocks to acting on the information. We investigate triggers that help to translate the information into action. In addition to exposure to the information by board interlocks, we suggest that the self‐interest of the individuals who create these ties and hierarchical power of interlinked firms determines the likelihood of taking actions of adopting new practices.
Using the action of adopting two distinctive governance practices, stock option pays or board reform, we find that sent ties and received ties affect the adoption decisions differently. Whereas sent ties reflect managerial interests, received ties derive power from a hierarchical relationship between the focal firm and the interlinked firm. Such differential nature of sent and received ties drives a differential result in terms of adopting two distinctive governance practices. We also find support for different moderating effects of firm performance on the impact of sent and received ties.
In this study, we incorporated the self‐interest of executives with sent ties to prior adopters and the power of directors who establish ties with prior adopters that are hierarchically positioned. By doing so, this study paints a more fine‐grained picture regarding underlying mechanisms by which information gained through ties is translated into action. This provides important insights for both agency theory and resource‐dependency theory.
Hierarchical board ties are not a unique phenomenon in Japan. We often find such ties in business groups in China, India, Korea, and some European countries. Establishing board interlocks among subsidiaries in a business group is an important governance resolution for controlling the whole business group. Hence, our findings that the ties carry not only information but also agent's interest and hierarchical power should be taken into account when a business group designs board interlocks.
board policy issues
resource dependence theory
80th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AOM 2020)
The contributions to society of market-based economic systems are undeniable and impressive. Markets have mobilized knowledge to deliver significant advances in prosperity, in terms of greater economic wealth. For decades prosperity had been accompanied by equally impressive gains in progress in terms of improved social well-being. However, while prosperity continues to advance, particularly where markets are most efficient, progress seems to have stalled. Today, scholars are again questioning whether prosperity can adequately deliver progress. We answer, in this paper, that it can—but only if guided by a purpose that is not determined by the blind pursuit of market efficiency and profit maximization. We explain how a relentless pursuit of efficiency allocates resources towards ever greater prosperity but often away from progress. Closing the prosperity–progress gap, we argue, will require a broader role for firms that includes market-shaping. We define market-shaping as the paradoxical process of persistently pursuing a purpose by allocating resources in a way that, on the one hand, shelters them from the market’s forces of efficiency, and on the other hand, redefines what the market indicates is efficient. In this way, markets and firms can reinstate themselves as engines of both prosperity and progress."
80th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AOM 2020)
In this paper, we reexamine the efficacy of redundant investment strategy and late entrance as a risk-hedging mechanism at the context of technological uncertainty, competition for an industry-wide dominance. Unlike recent findings against the effectiveness of such risk-hedging mechanisms, we identified a positive impact of dual investments by late entrants. In an early stage of a nascent industry when multiple (e.g. four or five) technologies competes, a dual investment strategy might not work. Later when the competition for dominance becomes a competition between two technologies, however, dual investments into the two technologies turns out effective. We also found that a business group structure contributes to managing complexity caused by dual investments. A semi-market structure institutionalized within a business group is effective in striking an optimal balance between internal competition and cooperation within the boundary of the firm."
Managers of international subsidiaries, especially subsidiary CEOs, operate at critical interfaces within multinational enterprises (MNEs) and hold strategic responsibility for the operations in their country. Yet, their impact on subsidiary performance has received scant research attention. Building on the subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategic leadership literatures, we develop a model of how subsidiary CEOs' entrepreneurial leadership affects subsidiary performance, and how this relationship is moderated by the subsidiary context that determines managerial discretion. We combine survey data of 291 international subsidiaries in South Korea with archival data to test our hypotheses. Our results show that subsidiary CEOs' entrepreneurial leadership enhances subsidiary performance and that this relationship is strengthened by managerial discretion. Our study highlights the pivotal role of subsidiary CEOs within MNEs and contributes to a microfoundational understanding of international subsidiary management.
While marketing literature highlights both short- and long-term detrimental effects of marketing myopic management on firm performance, understanding of its antecedents is rather limited. This paper aims to determine if a certain level of transient institutional investor ownership influences a firm's marketing as well as research and development (R&D) investment decisions. Drawing on agency theory, the effects of institutional investor are examined using a two-stage panel logit regression with instrument variables (IV). Empirical results show that a strong presence of short-term institutional investors leads to the practice of marketing myopic management. The transient institutional investors encourage managers to invest less in marketing and R&D as an effort to artificially inflate current-term performance. We propose some policy suggestions that might be used to reduce the practice of myopic management.
We present a novel measure of firm-level employment stability, defined as one minus a firm's employment elasticity with respect to its sales. We find that employment stability is positively associated with innovation output, measured by the number of patents and subsequent citations, and the originality and generality of the patents. Our findings suggest that employment stability enhances employees' incentives for innovation by providing tolerance for failure.
tolerance for failure
Academy of Management Journal
Despite their prevalence and significance, competitive wars have received limited attention from the strategy literature. Our knowledge of how inter-organizational linkages influence competitive wars is particularly lacking. Drawing on the social embeddedness perspective, we argue that both direct linkages (i.e., strategic alliances) and indirect linkages (i.e., common ownership ties and common analyst ties) reduce the likelihood of war, thereby functioning as the glue that binds firms together. Yet once competitive wars are launched in related markets, indirect linkages through common third parties may continuously function as glue, reducing the likelihood of war spillover, whereas direct linkages, such as strategic alliances, may facilitate the spillover of competitive wars, akin to adding gasoline to a fire. Using data from the U.S. domestic airline industry between 1991 and 2010, our empirical evidence offers strong support for our predictions.