本文根据 Douglas Cumming，T.Y. Leung，Oliver M. Rui. Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud. Academy of Management Journal, 2015, 1572-1593. 论文翻译而成。刘心洁编译，论文原作者之一芮萌教授对原文进行了适当改写。
We provide evidence from China that access to loans positively affects the probability that a firm will invest in innovation. However, the positive effect of private debt on innovation investment is significantly moderated by political instability. The cost of political instability on innovation is less severe when the entrepreneur has political connections to party leaders. Furthermore, we show that political connections increase the probability that an entrepreneur has access to direct governmental support for innovation investment. These findings are more. pronounced for technology intensive industries.
Academy of Management Journal
We formulate theory on the effect of board of director gender diversity on the broad spectrum of securities fraud, and generate three key insights. First, based on ethicality, risk aversion, and diversity, we hypothesize that gender diversity on boards can operate as a significant moderator for the frequency of fraud. Second, we advance that the stock market response to fraud from a more gender-diverse board is significantly less pronounced. Third, we posit that women are more effective in male-dominated industries in reducing both the frequency and severity of fraud. Results of our novel empirical tests, based on data from a large sample of Chinese firms that committed securities fraud, are largely consistent with each of these hypotheses.
Using the theories of the political marketplace and political instability, we examine the effect of political capital on firms’ access to bank loans in relation to the political environment. In particular, we use political capital inequality and political instability to characterize the political environment. Using a nationwide survey of private firms in 2010, we find that private firms have more difficulty in gaining access to bank lending as the degree of political capital inequality increases. Furthermore, political capital exerts a positive effect on access to bank loans only when political capital inequality and instability are above certain thresholds.