We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.
Management International Review
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance and institutional environments on the export behaviour of firms in emerging economies. We argue that the role of corporate governance should be analysed from both principal- agent and principal-principal perspectives. We hypothesise that institutional environments moderate the effects of corporate governance on export behaviour.
Analysis of a sample of Chinese listed firms supports our argument that outside directors and CEO shareholding help firms make export decisions, while the effects of ownership concentration may be non-monotonic.
Sample firms’ export propensity is higher the better the institutional environments of their locations. This positive effect of institutional environments comes both directly and from the moderating of the effects of corporate governance.
We study the asset pricing implications of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory, with a particular focus on its probability weighting component. Our main result, derived from a novel equilibrium with nonunique global optima, is that, in contrast to the prediction of a standard expected utility model, a security’s own skewness can be priced: a positively skewed security can be “overpriced” and can earn a negative average excess return. We argue that our analysis offers a unifying way of thinking about a number of seemingly unrelated financial phenomena.