International Journal of Finance Economics
This paper studies how monetary easing provides incentives for banks to take risk and issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and, because MBS have the "lemon" property, why MBS buyers are willing to purchase high-risk securities at high prices. Banks need equity to attract deposits. Monetary easing reduces this need, and banks leverage up and reduce their monitoring efforts. The internal need for liquidity and risk sharing motivates banks to issue MBS. Security buyers understand the moral hazard problem that banks face but are willing to purchase bank securities at high prices because monetary easing would also reduce their cost of funds.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science
This paper focuses on managers’ marketing decision making during performance decline. Drawing on the reconciliation of theories of failure-induced change and threat-rigidity by Ocasio (1995), we examine how performance decline may result in a rigid decision-making process and decision characteristics that reflect the narrowing of attention and increased risk seeking. Furthermore, drawing on managerial compensation research, we consider how incentive pay may affect the marketing decision-making process and decision characteristics of managers during performance decline. Using a simulation game with experienced Chinese managers, our results indicate that performance decline decreases marketing strategy process comprehensiveness but increases reliance on short-term marketing decisions, strategic change, and strategic risk taking. Moreover, incentive pay attenuates the rigid decision-making process of managers but accentuates their heightened risk seeking during performance decline. This paper offers unique behavioral insights into how managers make marketing decisions.
We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors.