CN EN
Advanced

Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power

Indexed by

SSCI Scopus

Abstract

Several authors recently pointed out that congestion pricing has no (or only partial) place at an airport when carriers have market power, since carriers themselves will internalize congestion. This article investigates the impact of such self-internalization on the airport, as this would effectively deprive the airport of an important source of funds for its capacity investment. We find that airline market structure has no impact on airport capacity and congestion for a welfare-maximizing airport that receives public subsidy, while somewhat surprisingly, both a private airport and a budget-constrained public airport would tend to over-invest in capacity when carriers have market power.

Keyword

Author Community

[Anming Zhang] Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2

[Yimin Zhang] China Europe International Business School, 699 Hongfeng Road, Pudong, Shanghai 201206, China; City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong


Related Article

Source

Journal of Urban Economics

ISSN:0094-1190

Year:2006

Issue:2

Volume:60

Page:229-247

Powered by JCR@2006

ESI Discipline:ECONOMICS & BUSINESS;

Cited Count
W
Loading... 104
C
Loading...
Get Fulltext
Rights and Licenses
Related Keywords
Communities & Collections
Access Stats
Creative Commons Licence
The content of CEIBS Research Online is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).