CN EN
Advanced

The effects of political connections and state ownership on corporate litigation in China

Indexed by

SSCI Scopus ABDC-A*

Abstract

We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process.

Keyword

Author Community

Finance and Accounting


Related Article

Source

The Journal of Law and Economics

ISSN:0022-2186

Year:2011

Issue:3

Volume:54

Page:573-607

Powered by JCR@2011

ESI Discipline:ECONOMICS & BUSINESS;

Cited Count
W
Loading... 74
C
Loading...
Get Fulltext
Rights and Licenses
Related Keywords
Communities & Collections
Access Stats
Creative Commons Licence
The content of CEIBS Research Online is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).