在上一期专栏文章中,我们从性别与道德、风险厌恶以及性别多样性角度三方面阐释了董事会中的性别多元化对欺诈频率和严重程度有哪些影响,并且我们还区分了这些因素在男性主导产业与女性主导产业中的不同表现。我们得出了三个假设:公司董事会中的女性成员减少了欺诈的频率,而在董事会中女性比例最高为50%的公司中,这种影响正在减弱;董事会的性别多样性减少了投资者对欺诈声明的负面反应;女性董事在男性主导行业的影响将强于女性主导的行业。
本文根据 Douglas Cumming，T.Y. Leung，Oliver M. Rui. Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud. Academy of Management Journal, 2015, 1572-1593. 论文翻译而成。刘心洁编译，论文原作者之一芮萌教授对原文进行了适当改写。
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
, 2019
, 54
(3)
, 1193-1230
SSCIABDC-A*
Abstract
We examine the role of relationship-based resource allocations during the approval process of secondary equity offerings (SEOs) in the Chinese capital market. In this unique regulatory setting, SEO-seeking firms must have their applications approved by an Issuance Examination Committee (IEC) of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a hybrid template between government-directed and market-directed models. We identify guanxi-based relationships as cases in which the partner of an intermediary professional firm (e.g., auditing or law) employed by the SEO applicant also serves on secondment as a full-time IEC member. Our results show that these guanxi-based relationships significantly increase the likelihood of SEO approvals, particularly for suspect SEO applicants with abnormal levels of earnings management, related-party transactions, and inter-company loans. More importantly, we find that guanxi-influenced SEO firms have significantly poorer performance in the post-SEO period, which indicates that it results in inefficient resource allocations. In addition, we show that these quid pro quo arrangements benefit IEC-member intermediaries through higher market shares and professional fee revenues. Overall, our evidence suggests that relationship-based resource allocations lead to negative spillover effects that impose social welfare losses.
