Abstract

33.8%的同比销量年增长率，让英菲尼迪在2015年的中国市场终于能足够引人注目。这个在2015年中国市场上唯一增速超过30%的品牌，2013年时还只是一个默默无闻的小众品牌。促使这一切发生改变的，是以英菲尼迪中国区总经理戴雷为首的中国团队，戴雷于2013年5月加入英菲尼迪。英菲尼迪希望在2017年比肩豪华车市场的德系三强（奥迪、奔驰、宝马），中国市场被赋予了主要的赶超使命，届时需要贡献至少10万辆销量。戴雷上任之前的2012年，英菲尼迪在华只有1.6万辆年销量。要在５年内实现年均44%的销量增长并且要获得跟德系三强一样的品牌力，戴雷有多大把握？特别的，进入2015年之后，英菲尼迪也像其它豪华车品牌对手们一样置身于持续低迷的中国市场。案例A描绘了英菲尼迪在中国市场2015年之前的发展轨迹，包括英菲尼迪总部对中国市场定位的变化、戴雷加入之后在品牌本地化定位、品牌营销方面的动作。案例B则陈述了面对2015年中国市场的低迷，英菲尼迪改变了之前以品牌打造为主的策略，将资源重心放在产品营销上，追求短期见效的结果。在这样一个不断变化的市场上采取不断变化的市场营销策略，戴雷能如愿实现英菲尼迪的5年规划吗？

Keyword

品牌定位 ;  小众品牌 ;  豪华车 ;  本土化 ;  内容营销 ;  感性营销

Abstract

33.8%的同比销量年增长率，让英菲尼迪在2015年的中国市场终于能足够引人注目。这个在2015年中国市场上唯一增速超过30%的品牌，2013年时还只是一个默默无闻的小众品牌。促使这一切发生改变的，是以英菲尼迪中国区总经理戴雷为首的中国团队，戴雷于2013年5月加入英菲尼迪。英菲尼迪希望在2017年比肩豪华车市场的德系三强（奥迪、奔驰、宝马），中国市场被赋予了主要的赶超使命，届时需要贡献至少10万辆销量。戴雷上任之前的2012年，英菲尼迪在华只有1.6万辆年销量。要在５年内实现年均44%的销量增长并且要获得跟德系三强一样的品牌力，戴雷有多大把握？特别的，进入2015年之后，英菲尼迪也像其它豪华车品牌对手们一样置身于持续低迷的中国市场。案例A描绘了英菲尼迪在中国市场2015年之前的发展轨迹，包括英菲尼迪总部对中国市场定位的变化、戴雷加入之后在品牌本地化定位、品牌营销方面的动作。案例B则陈述了面对2015年中国市场的低迷，英菲尼迪改变了之前以品牌打造为主的策略，将资源重心放在产品营销上，追求短期见效的结果。在这样一个不断变化的市场上采取不断变化的市场营销策略，戴雷能如愿实现英菲尼迪的5年规划吗？

Keyword

品牌定位 ;  小众品牌 ;  豪华车 ;  本土化 ;  内容营销 ;  感性营销

Abstract

年轻的豪华车品牌英菲尼迪将“感性”作为差异化标签开展营销，在2015年市场极其低迷的情况下增速超过30％。

Keyword

感性营销 ;  差异化 ;  豪华车 ;  品牌 ;  低迷 ;  市场

Abstract

“一切都是以市场为导向，全员普及市场化营销。通过市场化倒逼机制。”这或许是对目前左右品牌下沉模式最好的注解。相比汽车、房地产等高度集中化的产业领域，中国的家具市场充满了碎片化特征——在近万亿元的市场空间中，国内规模以上家具品牌超过2万个，但市场份额达到1％者却基本为零。

Keyword

家具品牌 ;  市场化营销 ;  以市场为导向 ;  倒逼机制 ;  产业领域 ;  市场空间 ;  家具市场 ;  市场份额

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to better understand the factors that competitive news providers consider to design or deliver news programmes. The focus is broadcast news where, in any programming time period, a viewer watches (or consumes) one programme. We assume that each viewer is interested in a limited set of topics and that her utility only comes from the “most interesting” news she observes. The key questions we address are as follows: (a) Should firms adopt designs that facilitate the delivery of more information in their news programmes? (b) Does the decision of firms to implement such strategies depend on the complexity of the news programme (i.e., the number of news stories covered in the news product)? (c) How do such strategies influence competition? We show that firms may or may not benefit by providing better-designed news. The incentive to do this is strongly affected by the complexity of the news product and the intensity of competition between news providers.

Keyword

game theory ;  information processing ;  media competition

Abstract

CNN, BBC or Fox? How do you decide? In order to better understand how competitive broadcast news providers can better attract and retain viewers, CEIBS Associate Professor of Marketing Xiang Yi has co-authored a research study that looks at how competition in the marketplace and the complexity of news stories interact to influence viewership.

Keyword

Abstract

Markets for information products exhibit varying degrees of competition on both the supply and the demand side. This paper studies the potential complementarity of information products, equilibrium information buying behaviors and information price setting in such markets. Our game-theoretic model consists of two information providers selling imperfect information to two competing clients and allows for different information quality levels as well as varying degrees of client competition. Absent of client competition, information providers compete on the statistical properties of the information they supply (i.e., the accuracy of the information). The competitive price can be high because of potential complementarity among information products when these are not very reliable. However, this may change when the clients are competing against each other. We adopt a reduced-form model of buyer competition that reflects situations where information buyers face discrete alternatives. We find that a buyer gains more through information acquisition when its competitor is less informed, suggesting a first mover advantage in information acquisition. More importantly, we also find that intense client competition can make the information products more substitutable, resulting in a lower equilibrium price for information. Furthermore, this effect leads to harsh competition between information providers and consequently provides incentives for exclusive contracting. In summary, it is found that the “quality” of information has a very different impact on sellers’ profits depending on the degree of client competition.

Keyword

Complements ;  Exclusive contracts ;  Information asymmetry ;  Information industry ;  Strategic substitutes