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We use data from a large survey of Chinese firms to investigate whether local government efforts to facilitate market development improve firm efficiency. Both government provision of information about products, markets, and innovation and government assistance in arranging loans are positively associated with firm efficiency, and those private firms with weak access to and knowledge of financial, input, and product markets benefit most from such assistance. These patterns are robust across multiple estimation approaches. Our examination of the determinants of local government facilitation also suggests that it gravitates toward promoting efficiency, though there are also indications that rent-seeking may play a role. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that government facilitation can help some firms overcome market failures in the early stages of a country's private sector development. Though causality is difficult to establish, we argue that changing fiscal dynamics that forced local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in generating revenue, and a government promotion system based on local economic performance, were key motivating factors for market facilitation by local government officials. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.

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China ;  ECONOMIC-GROWTH ;  FEDERALISM ;  FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION ;  Government facilitation ;  GRABBING HAND ;  Local government ;  Market failures ;  POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS ;  PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ;  PRIVATIZATION ;  PROPERTY-RIGHTS ;  STATE ;  TRANSITION ECONOMIES

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本文试图在朱天和张军(2014)对中国家庭消费支出被官方数据低估的研究基础上进一步考察中国的投资数据质量。我们发现,中国支出法GDP中的资本形成总额虽然名义上是独立核算出来的,但最终公布的数字却与严格按官方核算方法计算出来的结果大相径庭,基本上可以看成是按生产-收入法核算出来的GDP总额减去最终消费和净出口总额后的余项。在这种情况下,由于居民消费支出被低估,资本形成(即投资支出)也就被等量地高估了。 This paper investigates the quality of China＇s investment data. We follow strictly the official method to estimate the annual gross capital formation expenditure from 2004 to 2012, and find that the resulting figures are significantly different from the official statistics. We conclude that the official capital formation figure is practically a residual item derived from subtracting the amount of estimated final consumption and net exports from the official GDP （based on the production cum income method）. As a result, the underestimation of of China＇s consumption expenditure has automatically been translated into the overestimation its investment expenditure.

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固定资产投资 ;  支出法GDP构成 ;  最终消费

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This paper attempts to formalize the transaction cost theory of the firm. Building on the formal approach of Grossman and Hart (1986), a model is developed to capture the essential elements of the transaction cost theory, particularly those that are distinct from the formal property rights theory (PRT). In contrast to the PRT model, ours focuses on specific investments in alienable assets and ex post transactional inefficiencies. We define integration of two firms to imply common ownership of alienable assets from both firms, which entails control rights over the use of the assets as well as claims on their residual value. One important advantage of the model is its ability to deal with integration between non-owner-managed firms.

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Building upon recent research into the underestimation of China’s official final consumption expenditure, this paper investigates the quality of China’s investment data. We strictly follow the official method to estimate the annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) expenditure from 2004 to 2012, and the resulting figures are significantly different from the official statistics. This implies that the ‘total investment in fixed assets’ data, which are the primary source for the estimation of GFCF, grossly exaggerate actual investments, and that the official GFCF figures are not, strictly speaking, independently estimated, as they are purported to be. We deduce that the official gross capital formation figure is more or less a residual item obtained by subtracting final consumption and net exports from the official GDP figure that is calculated based on the production-cum-income approach. As a result, the underestimation of China’s consumption expenditure automatically translates into overestimation of investment expenditure. We conclude that China’s official consumption and investment statistics cannot be trusted as the basis for policy discussions and academic research.

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capital formation ;  final consumption ;  GDP by expenditure approach ;  investment in fixed assets

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《中国增长之谜》1978年以前，没人预测到中国会是过去30多年里世界上经济发展最快的国家。今天，很多人都将这个成就归功于1978年开始的改革开放。但是，改革开放只能解释中国经济增长为什么在1978年后快过1978年之前，而不能解释为什么同时也远快过其他国家。而且，绝大多数发展中国家在过去二三十年里也都在不同程度上实行了改革开放政策，很多国家的市场化程度比我们还要高，但为什么没有国家的发展速度超过中国？ 中国比发达国家增长快也许不奇怪，可以说是因为原来的基数低。难以解释的是：为什么中国经济增长比所有其他发展中国家都更快？ 这，就是中国增长之谜！ 中欧国际工商学院经济学教授朱天将从全球比较的视角，就这一谜题六问中国： ·中国的增长究竟有多快？ ·中国的体制与政策优势有多大？ ·中国经济增长的动力和优势究竟是什么？ ·中国经济增长失衡吗？ ·中国增长的前景如何？ ·中国真正的挑战是什么？ 在大量数据分析的基础上，《中国增长之谜》从体制和文化两个角度为大家揭开中国经济的非凡增长之谜，指明当今观察中国宏观经济的认知陷阱和误区。

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As an extension of Wang and Zhu (2005), this short paper shows that the popular 51:49 equity structure can be optimal. This equity structure in joint ventures (JVs) has puzzled economists the world over. We find that, when the two parties are highly asymmetric in their abilities to acquire private benefits from their JV, the 51:49 equity structure is optimal and as efficient as joint control.

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51:49 equity structure ;  Control rights ;  Income rights ;  Joint control

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China’s consumption rate is widely believed to be too low. In this paper, we show that official statistics have significantly underestimated Chinese household consumption. First, a lot of private consumption is paid for by companies but cannot be accounted for in official statistics. Second, housing consumption is underestimated because of the construction cost-based method. Third, and most important, high-income households are significantly underrepresented in the household surveys upon which household consumption statistics are based. We reestimate China’s household consumption by correcting for the latter two sources of underestimation. Our reestimation suggests that China’s final consumption expenditure is at least close to 60% of GDP, about 10 percentage points higher than the official figure.

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Chinese economy ;  consumption ;  household survey ;  national accounts