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This paper is a preliminary attempt to use both the value added approach with double deflation and the expenditure approach to deflate China's nominal GDP over 15 years (2004-2018). The results show that China's real GDP growth during the period has significantly more fluctuations than the official statistics indicate. Additionally, inflation, as measured by the official implicit GDP deflator, is generally overestimated during boom years but underestimated during downturn years. In particular, it is shown that China's growth slowdown in recent years before the COVID19 pandemic may have been more severe than official figures suggest.

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Chinese statistics ;  GDP deflator ;  GDP growth

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改革开放四十年，中国人均国民收入增长了25倍，冠绝全球。但近年来，中国经济增长的速度急剧下滑，GDP增长率已经从最高位2007年的14.2%滑落到2018年的6.6%。是什么造就了中国三十多年高速增长的奇迹？近些年经济下行的原因又是什么？中美贸易摩擦将如何影响中国经济的未来？回答这些问题至关重要，因为这不仅关系到我们对中国经济前景的判断，也关系到中国继续发展的政策选择，还关系到中国经验是否可以复制到其他发展中国家。本书通过区分中长期经济增长和短期经济波动，区分增长的直接动因和根本动因，为读者层层剖析中国式增长的特征和动力。作者从全球比较的角度，阐明了中国经济增长的比较优势，也批评了流行观点对中国经济的误判。

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本文试图在朱天和张军(2014)对中国家庭消费支出被官方数据低估的研究基础上进一步考察中国的投资数据质量。我们发现,中国支出法GDP中的资本形成总额虽然名义上是独立核算出来的,但最终公布的数字却与严格按官方核算方法计算出来的结果大相径庭,基本上可以看成是按生产-收入法核算出来的GDP总额减去最终消费和净出口总额后的余项。在这种情况下,由于居民消费支出被低估,资本形成(即投资支出)也就被等量地高估了。 This paper investigates the quality of China＇s investment data. We follow strictly the official method to estimate the annual gross capital formation expenditure from 2004 to 2012, and find that the resulting figures are significantly different from the official statistics. We conclude that the official capital formation figure is practically a residual item derived from subtracting the amount of estimated final consumption and net exports from the official GDP （based on the production cum income method）. As a result, the underestimation of of China＇s consumption expenditure has automatically been translated into the overestimation its investment expenditure.

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固定资产投资 ;  支出法GDP构成 ;  最终消费

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We use data from a large survey of Chinese firms to investigate whether local government efforts to facilitate market development improve firm efficiency. Both government provision of information about products, markets, and innovation and government assistance in arranging loans are positively associated with firm efficiency, and those private firms with weak access to and knowledge of financial, input, and product markets benefit most from such assistance. These patterns are robust across multiple estimation approaches. Our examination of the determinants of local government facilitation also suggests that it gravitates toward promoting efficiency, though there are also indications that rent-seeking may play a role. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that government facilitation can help some firms overcome market failures in the early stages of a country's private sector development. Though causality is difficult to establish, we argue that changing fiscal dynamics that forced local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in generating revenue, and a government promotion system based on local economic performance, were key motivating factors for market facilitation by local government officials. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.

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China ;  ECONOMIC-GROWTH ;  FEDERALISM ;  FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION ;  Government facilitation ;  GRABBING HAND ;  Local government ;  Market failures ;  POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS ;  PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ;  PRIVATIZATION ;  PROPERTY-RIGHTS ;  STATE ;  TRANSITION ECONOMIES

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This paper attempts to formalize the transaction cost theory of the firm. Building on the formal approach of Grossman and Hart (1986), a model is developed to capture the essential elements of the transaction cost theory, particularly those that are distinct from the formal property rights theory (PRT). In contrast to the PRT model, ours focuses on specific investments in alienable assets and ex post transactional inefficiencies. We define integration of two firms to imply common ownership of alienable assets from both firms, which entails control rights over the use of the assets as well as claims on their residual value. One important advantage of the model is its ability to deal with integration between non-owner-managed firms.

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As an extension of Wang and Zhu (2005), this short paper shows that the popular 51:49 equity structure can be optimal. This equity structure in joint ventures (JVs) has puzzled economists the world over. We find that, when the two parties are highly asymmetric in their abilities to acquire private benefits from their JV, the 51:49 equity structure is optimal and as efficient as joint control.

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51:49 equity structure ;  Control rights ;  Income rights ;  Joint control

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